I am a Ph.D. candidate in Economics at the Pennsylvania State University. My research is in microeconomic theory and experimental economics. I will be available for interviews at the EEA Job Market in Rotterdam and the 2020 ASSA meeting in San Diego.
Creative Contests ― Theory and Experiment (Job Market Paper)
Abstract: In many competitions where creativity and innovation play a large role (e.g., architecture design competitions or research grant competitions), contestants can be uncertain about the organizer’s exact preferences. I develop a model of creative contests in which two firms compete by adjusting their designs when they are uncertain about the contest organizer’s ideal design. My model contrasts with existing contest models, as the latter assume organizer preferences instead to be public knowledge. A model of creative contests that accounts for such uncertainty enables us to study many new questions. In particular, I investigate whether an organizer should disclose her ideal design to contestants and find that disclosure is not always optimal for organizers, because disclosing an ideal design favors one participant over the other and thus discourages competition. I also conduct a laboratory experiment to test the model’s empirical relevance when assumptions about rationality and risk-neutrality are not necessarily satisfied and find that the results are generally consistent with theoretical predictions for contestants’ behavior and for whether the organizer benefits from disclosure.
On Optimal Favoritism in All-Pay Contests (Submitted)
Abstract: I analyze optimal favoritism in a complete-information all-pay contest with two players, whose costs of effort are weakly convex. The contest designer could favor or harm some contestants using two instruments: head starts and handicaps. I find that equilibrium effort distributions are ranked according to how symmetric the two players are, in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance. Consequently, regardless of which instrument is used and what the designer's objective is, "levelling the playing field" is optimal.
Single Prize Contests (joint with Ron Siegel )We develop a technique to solve for general single prize contests.
Sure or Not? Mixed Strategies Can Be the Strict Best Response (joint with Jason Shachat)An experimental study of how ambiguity, beliefs and mixed strategies interact in repeated games.
Overbidding and RandomizationAn experimental investigation of whether inability to randomize is a source of overbidding.
Introductory Microeconomics (Online, 2018 and 2019)
Introductory Microeconomics (2014 and 2019)
Introductory Macroeconomics (2015)
Labor Economics and Labor Markets (2015 - 2017)
Public Finance and Fiscal Policy (2016 and 2018)
Monetory Theory and Policy (2017 - 2018)
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303 Kern Building, University Park, PA 16802